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Abstract 
The mental representation of the self is a complex construct, comprising both conceptual 
information, and perceptual information regarding the body. Evidence suggests that both the 
conceptual self-representation and the bodily self-representation are malleable, and that these 
different aspects of the self are linked. Changes in bodily self-representation appear to affect 
how the self is conceptualised, but it is unclear whether the opposite relationship is also true: 
do changes to the conceptual self-representation affect how the physical self is perceived? 
First, we adopted a perceptual matching paradigm to establish an association between the self 
and an unfamiliar face (Experiment 1). Robust attentional and perceptual biases in the 
processing of this newly self-associated object suggested that the conceptual self-
representation was extended to include it. Next, we measured whether the bodily self-
representation had correspondingly changed to incorporate the new face (Experiment 2). 
Participants rated morphs between their own and the new-associated face according to how 
similar they were to the self, before and after performing the perceptual matching task. 
Changes to the conceptual self did not have an effect on the bodily self-representation. These 
results suggest that modulatory links between aspects of the mental self-representation are 
unidirectional, and flow in a bottom-up manner.  
Keywords: self, self-face, social cognition, self-concept, body representation 
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Can the self become another? Investigating the effects of self-association with a new facial 
identity. 
The mental representation of the self is a complex construct, containing both 
perceptual information (such as information regarding the physical appearance of the body, 
e.g. facial appearance), and conceptual information, which is comprised of varied semantic 
and episodic knowledge relevant to the self. Evidence from a variety of different research 
areas has shown that both the bodily self-representation (Tsakiris, 2008, 2010), and the 
conceptual self-representation, are malleable (Sui, He, & Humphreys, 2012). Importantly, 
different aspects of the self-representation appear to be linked. Changes in the bodily self-
representation have been shown to elicit changes in the way the self is conceptualised 
(Banakou, Groten, & Slater, 2013) and to also elicit changes in social cognition (Maister, 
Slater, Sanchez-Vives, & Tsakiris, 2014). There is some evidence to suggest that the 
converse relationship is also true; that altering the self-concept can drive plasticity in the 
mental representation of one’s body (Farmer, McKay, & Tsakiris, 2013). However, a 
modulatory link between the conceptual and the bodily self-representation, flowing in a top-
down direction from conceptual to bodily self, has not been well evidenced. 
It is well known that we show a processing bias for ‘self-relevant’ stimuli. This bias 
has been shown for stimuli relevant to the conceptual self-representation (e.g. one’s own 
name or the name of one’s hometown; Gray, Ambadi, Lowenthal, & Deldin, 2004, Bargh, 
1982) and also stimuli relevant to the bodily self-representation (such as images of one’s own 
face or body; Tong & Nakayama, 1999; Devue et al., 2007). An example of such a bias in the 
conceptual domain comes from a study using a dichotic listening task, in which participants 
are presented with two streams of auditory information, one in each ear, and attend to only 
one. Information in the unattended stream only enters conscious awareness when it contains 
words relating to the conceptual self-representation (Bargh, 1982). Similar effects are seen in 
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the bodily domain; we are significantly faster to process images of our own face  (Tong & 
Nakayama, 1999) and our own body (Devue et al., 2007) than we are to process those 
belonging to other highly familiar individuals. This bias remains even when the task does not 
require explicit identity-recognition (Sui & Han, 2007). Evidence suggests that the self-face 
is particularly effective in capturing attention; when presented as a distractor, it drastically 
slows response times despite the purposeful direction of attention elsewhere (Brédart, 
Delchambre, & Laureys, 2006).  
Importantly, in a series of recent experiments, Sui, He, and Humphreys (2012) 
elegantly demonstrated the malleability of the conceptual self-representation. Participants 
first associated geometric shapes with labels for themselves, familiar or unfamiliar others, 
and then performed a perceptual matching task in which they judged whether subsequent 
label-shape pairings were correctly matched. Self-associated shapes benefitted from faster 
reaction times (RT) and increased accuracy, compared to both familiar and unfamiliar shape 
associations. The authors suggest that the self-associated shape was incorporated into the 
‘self-template’, a rich and well developed schema of the self based on self-knowledge, 
enabling “fast same” responses (participants are faster to identify when two pieces of 
information are the same, rather than different; Krueger, 1978). In support of this 
interpretation, they found that neutral shapes which had been associated with the conceptual 
self activate brain regions involved in self-representation and self-attention (Sui, Rotshtein, & 
Humphreys, 2013), suggesting that the newly-associated shape has been incorporated into the 
conceptual self-representation. This incorporation into the conceptual self-representation may 
then lead to the extension of the self-processing bias to the newly associated information. 
There is also mounting evidence indicating that the bodily self-representation can be 
quickly and effectively altered. Bodily illusions demonstrate how multisensory integration 
can lead to changes in how one perceives one’s own body. During the enfacement illusion a 
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participant is stroked on the cheek while watching an unfamiliar face being stroked on the 
cheek in synchrony. Following a brief period of this interpersonal multisensory stimulation 
(IMS), participants reported an increase in perceived physical similarity between their own 
face and the other’s face. This subjective experience is accompanied by objectively measured 
changes in the participants’ abilities to discriminate between morphed images containing 
more or less of their own face or the other’s face (Maister, Banissy, & Tsakiris, 2013; 
Mazzurega, Pavani, Paladino, & Schubert, 2011; Sforza, Bufalari, Haggard, & Aglioti, 2010; 
Tajadura-Jiménez, Grehl, & Tsakiris, 2012; Tsakiris, 2008). 
Intriguingly, there is evidence to suggest that conceptual and bodily aspects of self-
representation are closely linked. For example, changes in the way the body is represented, 
elicited by bodily illusions, can alter conceptual self-associations (Banakou et al., 2013; 
Maister et al., 2014; Paladino, Mazzurega, Pavani, & Schubert, 2010). Banakou et al. (2013) 
demonstrated that after embodying a child-sized body in a virtual reality environment, 
participants showed implicit associations between themselves and child-like concepts. In 
another study, Paladino et al. (2010) demonstrated that after experiencing IMS with an 
unfamiliar face, not only did participants report an increase in perceived physical similarity 
between themselves and the unfamiliar actor, but the IMS also led them to represent 
themselves as conceptually closer and more similar to the embodied other (see also 
Mazzurega et al., 2011). However, it remains unknown whether this link is bidirectional; can 
a change in conceptual self-representation lead to changes in the bodily self-representation?  
Interestingly, recent evidence suggests that a bidirectional link may exist. Farmer, 
McKay and Tsakiris (2013) report an experiment in which the manipulated trustworthiness of 
an unfamiliar individual impacted upon perceived similarity between the participant’s face 
and the unfamiliar face. Participants played a trust game with two unfamiliar individuals 
whose faces were shown on screen. One of the individuals was trustworthy, while the other 
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always betrayed the participant’s trust. Before and after the game, participants performed a 
self-other discrimination task using morphed images (the same task as used to measure the 
increased perceptual similarity after the enfacement illusion; Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012), 
to measure the perceived similarity between their own face and the faces of both players. 
Following the trust game, participants perceived their face to be more similar to the 
trustworthy individual than the untrustworthy player. Potentially this evidence suggests that 
altering the conceptual self-representation may have a modulatory effect on the bodily self-
representation. Taken together with evidence from bodily illusions, these findings suggest 
that a bidirectional relationship exists between the conceptual and bodily self-representations; 
however, such a link has yet to be properly investigated.  
We here exploit the simple paradigm reported by Sui et al. (2012) to investigate 
whether a bidirectional link between conceptual and bodily aspects of self exists. In this 
paradigm, they established a rapid association between the self and a previously neutral 
object. Robust attentional and perceptual biases in the processing of this newly self-
associated object suggested that the conceptual self-representation was extended to include it. 
Our aims are two-fold; first, we aim to develop this paradigm to test whether an unfamiliar 
face, rather than shape, can be associated with the conceptual self-representation. We will 
therefore measure perceptual biases towards the newly self-associated face in order to assess 
whether it has truly acquired an association with the conceptual self-representation 
(Experiment 1). We will then measure if the bodily self-representation has correspondingly 
changed to incorporate the new face (Experiment 2). This will allow us to assess, using two 
simple and well-established paradigms, whether a change in the conceptual self-
representation can lead to change in the bodily self-representation (i.e the mental 
representation of one’s own face). 
Experiment 1 
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Participants 
Twenty participants (15 female, mean age 19.95 years, SD = 1.88) volunteered to take 
part in the study. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and were right-handed. 
Informed consent was given by all participants before their participation, and the study was 
approved by Psychology Department Ethics Committee, Royal Holloway, University of 
London. 
Stimuli and Tasks 
We used an adapted version of Sui et al. (2012)’s shape-label matching paradigm with 
unfamiliar faces in place of neutral geometric shapes. Three gender-matched unfamiliar 
faces, with non-facial features removed, were converted to greyscale and used in the face-
label matching task. The faces were presented above a fixation cross, with an identity label 
presented below. Three identity labels were used: ‘Self’, ‘Friend’, and ‘Stranger’, following 
Sui et al. (2012). During the task participants were required to judge whether briefly-
presented face-label pairings were correct, or incorrect. The task was run on Presentation 
(NeuroBehavioural Systems). 
Procedure 
The experiment started with a learning phase, in which all three unfamiliar faces were 
presented on screen with their matching identity labels written below each one (face-label 
pairings were counterbalanced across participants). Participants were told that each of the 
three faces belonged to themselves, their closest friend, or a stranger. Participants had 60 
seconds to learn the face-label pairings before starting the matching task. During the 
matching task, a fixation cross was presented at the beginning of each trial for 400ms, 
followed by a face-label pairing for 200ms. The face-label pairing either corresponded to a 
pairing seen by participants during the learning phase (match trial), or was a novel pairing 
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(mismatch trial). Participants were then required to judge whether the pairing was correct or 
incorrect based on what they had learnt during the learning phase. Following presentation of 
the face-label pairing, participants had 1000ms to respond, using one of two buttons (one for 
correct, one for incorrect), as quickly and as accurately as possible. Visual feedback for the 
participant’s response was then presented following each trial (correct or incorrect), lasting 
500ms. The task lasted a maximum of 15 minutes and was split into three blocks of 120 
trials, with 12 practice trials before the first block. At the end of each block participants 
received visual feedback detailing the accuracy of their performance in the preceding block. 
Each identity label was presented an equal number of times, with an equal number of match 
and mismatch pairings, such that there were 60 trials in each condition (self-match, self-
mismatch, friend-match, friend-mismatch, stranger-match, stranger-mismatch). Trials were 
randomised for each participant. This procedure is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: A visual representation of the Matching Task. In the Learning Phase all three unfamiliar faces and identity labels 
(self, friend and stranger) are presented on screen for 1 min. In the Matching Phase, each trial starts with a fixation cross 
(400ms), followed by a face-label pair (200ms), after which the participant has 1000ms to respond. Following the response, 
visual feedback is presented for 500ms before the start of the next trial. 
 
 
Results  
Before analysis, data were cleaned within-subjects, by excluding responses outside 
2SD of each trial-type mean.  
CAN THE SELF BECOME ANOTHER?  9 
 
 
 
Accuracy on the matching task was assessed using a signal detection approach. D’, 
reflecting perceptual sensitivity to each face, was calculated by combining performance in 
each face identity condition across both match and mismatch trials. A repeated measures 
ANOVA with a within-subjects factor of Face Identity (Self vs. Friend vs. Stranger) was run 
on d’ scores. There was a significant main effect of Face Identity, F (2, 38) = 4.96, p = .012, 
2  = .21, reflecting larger d’ scores for self-associations than both other identity associations 
(p = .007), while there was no difference between friend and stranger associations (p = .18). 
To investigate the effect of Face Identity on RT, a repeated-measures ANOVA was 
run with factors of Face Identity and Match-type. There was a main effect of Match-type, F 
(1, 19) = 89.90, p < .001, 2  = .83, reflecting faster RTs for matched pairs relative to 
mismatched pairs (p < .001). There was also an interaction between Identity and Matching 
Judgment, F (2, 38) = 34.34, p < .001, 2  = .75.  
To investigate the interaction, analysis was run separately on matched and 
mismatched pairs. For mismatched pairs, there was a significant effect of Face Identity on 
RTs, F (2, 38) = 5.77, p = .006, 2  =  .40. Self mismatched pairs (i.e. those featuring the self-
associated face, but either a ‘friend’ or ‘stranger’ label) benefitted from faster RTs than both 
Friend and Stranger mismatched pairs (p = .002). Friend and Stranger pairs did not differ (p = 
.54). For matched pairs, Face Identity also had a significant effect on RTs, F (2, 38) = 10.01, 
p = .001, 2  =  .57. Self-associations elicited faster responses than other association types (p 
< .001), whereas friend and stranger associations did not differ (p = .997).  The data are 
visualised in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Behavioural results from the Matching Task. Mean RTs (A), accuracy (B) and D-prime (C) to self, friend and 
stranger-associated faces for match trials (face and label were correctly matched) and mismatch trials (the label presented did 
not match the face). Error bars represent standard error. D shows the bootstrapped sample means (resampling with 
replacement repeated for 2000 samples) for match and mismatch trials. RTs are represented on the y-axis with accuracy on 
the x-axis. A bootstrapping procedure combining accuracy and RT was adopted to examine the distribution characteristics of 
each trial type (see Sui et al., 2012). 
 
 
Experiment 1 Discussion 
In Experiment 1, we measured the effects of associating an unfamiliar face with the 
self on perceptual processing. Our results showed a clear perceptual prioritisation effect 
towards the unfamiliar face after only a brief period of self-association, which manifested 
itself in faster reaction times, higher accuracy and increased perceptual sensitivity to the self-
associated face over faces associated with a friend or stranger. The pattern of results closely 
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mirrored those reported by Sui et al. (2012), in an analogous task using neutral shapes instead 
of faces. This suggests that the conceptual self-representation can be rapidly extended to 
incorporate an unfamiliar face, and that correspondingly, perceptual and attentional 
processing of that face is prioritised as ‘self-relevant’.  
Experiment 2 
Following the successful inclusion of a previously unfamiliar face into the conceptual 
self-representation in Experiment 1, we aimed to investigate whether this inclusion would 
alter the mental representation of one’s own face. Therefore, Experiment 2 followed the same 
procedure as Experiment 1, with the addition of a self-recognition task before and after the 
matching task. In the self-recognition task participants rated how similar morphed images 
between their own face and the self-associated face were to their own face (Sforza et al., 
2010). The pre-association self-recognition task acted as a baseline measure of self-
recognition, and we looked for changes from baseline in the post-matching-task self-
recognition task. We controlled for effects due to mere exposure to the self-associated face by 
including a control condition in which participants rated morphs between their own face and 
the stranger-associated face.  
Participants 
28 new participants (26 female, mean age 20.07 years, SD 1.12) were recruited for the 
second experiment. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and were right-handed. 
Informed consent was given by all participants before their participation, and the study was 
approved by Psychology Department Ethics Committee, Royal Holloway, University of 
London. 
Stimuli and Tasks 
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Matching Task. The stimuli for the matching task were exactly the same as those 
used in Experiment 1.  
Self-recognition Task. A photograph of each participant’s face with a neutral 
expression was taken, flipped horizontally (so as to reflect the orientation of their face that 
they would commonly see in a mirror) and converted to greyscale. All non-facial features 
were removed using an oval template. Two sets of morphed face images were created for 
each participant by morphing the participant’s face separately with the self-associated and 
stranger-associated faces from the matching task. Fifty morphed images were created for 
each set, representing 2% steps from the participant’s face to the self/stranger face (see 
Figure 3). During the self-recognition task, each of the 100 images was presented once, and 
participants rated how similar they perceived the face to their own.  
Procedure 
Participants performed the self-recognition task first (lasting for approximately 8-10 
minutes), followed by the matching task (lasting approximately 10 minutes), and lastly the 
self-recognition task again. The procedure for the matching task was the same as in 
Experiment 1, except that the trial count was reduced to 240 (three blocks of 80 trials). 
Self-recognition task. Each trial of the self-recognition task began with a central 
fixation cross, presented for 500-1500ms. One of the 100 morphed face images was then 
presented for 2000ms, replaced by a sliding scale consisting of a vertical line marked with 
100 at the top and 0 at the bottom. Participants used a mouse to rate on the scale how much 
the presented face resembled their own face. Participants had as much time as they required 
to give their response, but were encouraged to go with their initial instincts about the photos 
and respond quickly. Images from both morphing sets (‘self’ and ‘stranger’) were intermixed 
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and presented in a randomised order. The procedure and example stimuli are presented in 
Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: The experimental design and procedure for Experiment 2. A shows an example of the morphed-face 
stimuli used in the self-recognition task. Personalised morphs were created for each participant, morphing their own face 
with the self-associated and stranger-associated faces. B shows a trial from the self-recognition task: a random interstimulus 
interval (ISI) with fixation cross is presented for 500-1500ms, followed by the presentation of one of the morphed images for 
2000ms. The sliding response scale then appears until participants make their response. C shows the procedure for 
Experiment 2: participants complete the self-recognition, followed by the matching task from Experiment 1, and lastly the 
self-recognition task again. 
 
Results 
First we analysed performance on the matching task. Mean RTs and accuracy 
performance for each trial type are visualised in Figure 4. 
D’ was calculated according to a signal detection analysis. It was entered into a 
repeated-measures ANOVA with the within-subjects factor of Face Identity (Self vs. Friend 
vs. Stranger). There was a significant main effect of Identity, F (2, 52) = 3.574, p = .035, 2  
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= .12. Self-associations benefited from a larger d’ than both friend and stranger associations 
(p = .026). There was no difference between friend and stranger associations (p = .411).  
Next, RT was analysed with factors of Face Identity and Match-type. There was a 
main effect of Identity, F (2, 52) = 3.68, p = .03, 2  = .12 reflecting faster RTs to self-
associations relative to friend and stranger associations (p = .018). There was also a main 
effect of Match-type, F (1, 26) = 105.76, p < .001, 2  = .80, reflecting faster RTs for 
matched pairs relative to mismatched pairs (p < .001). The interaction between Identity and 
Matching Judgment was also significant, F (2, 52) = 11.34, p < .001, 2  = .30. We then ran 
analyses separately for matched and mismatched trials. There was no effect of Face Identity 
for mismatched trials, F (2, 42) = .36, p = .70, 2  = .01. However, for Matched trials, Face 
Identity had a significant effect on RTs, F (2, 52) = 8.54, p = .001, 2  = .25. Self-associations 
showed faster RTs than both friend and stranger associations (p = .002). Friend and stranger 
associations did not significantly differ (p = .172). The pattern of results is illustrated in 
Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: Behavioural results from the Matching Task for Experiment 2. Mean RTs (A), accuracy (B) and D-
prime (C) to self, friend and stranger-associated faces for match trials (face and label were correctly matched) and mismatch 
trials (the label presented did not match the face). Error bars represent standard error. D shows the bootstrapped sample 
means for match and mismatch trials. The same bootstrapping technique used as in Experiment 1. 
 
Next we analysed the data for the self-recognition task.  We fitted the data into a 
sigmoid statistical model to determine the percentage of morphing at which the participant 
judged the amount of their own face and the other face to be equal (PSE; Sforza et al., 2010). 
To check that baseline PSE values for self-associated morphs and stranger-associated morphs 
did not differ, we first analysed the baseline PSE scores for each morph set in a repeated 
measures ANOVA with Morph Identity as a factor. There was no effect of morph identity on 
baseline PSE scores F (1, 27) = .65, p = .43, 2  = .02, so we then analysed the PSE values in 
a repeated measures ANOVA with factors Morph Identity (‘Self’ vs ‘Stranger’ morphs) and 
Timing of Task (Pre- vs. Post-matching task). There was no main effect of Morph Identity, F 
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(1, 27) = .51, 2  = .01, or Timing of Task, F (1, 27) = 2.89, p = .10, 2  = .10, nor an 
interaction between Morph Identity and Timing, F (1, 27) = .25, p = .62, 2  = .01, indicating 
that PSE scores were not influenced by the timing of the task or the association of a new face 
with the self. See Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: The bars represent the point in the morphing spectrum that participants perceived there to be an equal 
amount of their own and the other face (PSE). On the left are the mean PSEs for self and self-associated-face morphs, before 
and after the matching task. On the right are mean PSEs for self and stranger-associated face morphs, before and after the 
matching task. Positive changes from pre- to post-test would indicate an increased amount of the other’s face at the 
perceived PSE, while negative changes would indicate more of the self face at the perceived PSE. 
 
General Discussion 
In this study, we tested whether a change in the conceptual representation of the self 
could elicit a change in the perceptual, bodily representation of the self. To do this, we first 
tested whether an association could be formed between the conceptual self-representation and 
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an unfamiliar face. Following this association, we investigated whether a corresponding 
incorporation of the unfamiliar face had occurred in the bodily self-representation, such that 
participants would perceive an increase in physical similarity between their own and the 
newly associated face. 
Previously, Sui et al. (2012) showed how a neutral shape could rapidly become 
associated with the conceptual self-representation, demonstrated by robust attentional and 
perceptual biases to the newly associated stimuli. We replicated this effect and extended it to 
the association of previously unfamiliar faces. Participants learned to associate identity labels 
(self, friend and stranger) with three previously unfamiliar faces, and then performed a 
perceptual matching task in which they judged whether presented face-label pairings were 
correct or incorrect. Over two experiments, we showed how an unfamiliar face could quickly 
become associated with the self, and that this benefitted the self-associated face with 
prioritised perceptual processing. Trials featuring an unfamiliar face previously associated 
with a self-label were responded to faster and more accurately than trials featuring faces 
associated with a friend or stranger.  
In Experiment 2, we investigated whether this association of an unfamiliar face with 
the conceptual self-representation had an effect on the way the physical, bodily self was 
represented. We measured changes in perceived similarity between the participants’ own face 
and an unfamiliar face, before and after a self-association with the unfamiliar face was 
established.  However, we found that this incorporation of an unfamiliar face into the self-
concept, and thus a change of the self at a conceptual level, was not able to alter the physical 
representation of the self. Following successful association of the self with an unfamiliar 
face, participants did not perceive their own face as more similar to the unfamiliar face.  
The self-face is the most salient aspect of one’s body. One’s own face automatically 
captures attention (Brédart et al., 2006) and demands preferential processing above all other 
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faces (Sui & Humphreys, 2013; Tong & Nakayama, 1999). Yet despite this strong salience of 
our own face, our results demonstrate that we are able to rapidly associate a previously 
unfamiliar face with our conceptual self-representation. Our results show a distinct response 
pattern to self-associated faces compared to both friend and stranger associations, reflecting 
the perceptual processing bias afforded to self-relevant stimuli. This rapid modification of 
perceptual processing to newly acquired self-associations fits in with a growing 
understanding of plasticity in the self, both in the physical and conceptual domains (bodily 
self: Paladino et al., 2010; Sforza et al., 2010; Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012; Tsakiris, 2008; 
conceptual self: Banakou et al., 2013; Maister et al., 2014).  
The association of a previously unfamiliar face with the conceptual self-representation 
did not affect the perception of one’s own face. On one level, this is surprising as previous 
research has demonstrated the striking malleability of the self-face representation (Paladino et 
al., 2010; Sforza et al., 2010; Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012), and has also suggested the 
existence of functional links between conceptual and bodily aspects of the self-representation. 
For example, Paladino et al. (2010) showed that the modulation of perceived facial-similarity 
through interpersonal multisensory integration affects the experience of conceptual 
‘closeness’ with the IMS individual, increasing the perception of not only physical but also 
psychological similarity. There was also evidence to suggest that the converse relationship 
might be true; that the modulation of conceptual aspects of self may have a knock-on effect 
on the bodily self-representation. The modulation of trust with another individual has been 
shown to affect the perceived physical similarity between one’s self and the other individual 
(Farmer et al., 2013). Based on this we hypothesised that the association of the conceptual 
self with an unfamiliar face would affect the perceived physical similarity between the self 
and the self-associated face. However, our findings demonstrated no functional link between 
alterations to the conceptual self-representation and the bodily self-representation.  
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One explanation for our findings could be that our paradigm tested the pure effect of 
self-association on bodily representations, and lacked any form of social interaction. In 
contrast, Farmer et al. (2013)’s paradigm involved an interaction with another through a trust 
game, in which the other player actively rewarded or punished the participant. The effect of 
trustworthiness on increased perceived physical similarity may play a functional role, as it 
could induce kin-like behaviours in future interactions, benefitting the participant (DeBruine, 
Jones, Little, & Perrett, 2008). DeBruine (2002) has shown that individuals are more likely to 
trust others who bear a physical resemblance to them, and so a modulation of the bodily-self 
representation to more closely resemble those who act pro-socially towards one’s self may 
reflect a functional role in driving future interactions.  
Despite there being evidence for changes in body representation leading to changes in 
conceptual self- and other-processing (Banakou et al., 2013; Maister et al., 2014; Paladino et 
al., 2010), our results suggest that the converse relationship, whereby basic self-association at 
the conceptual level can alter body representations, does not hold. Therefore, our results 
support a hierarchical model of the self with unidirectional connections flowing in a bottom-
up direction, from bodily self-representations to conceptual self-representations. If this is the 
case, then it is important to investigate the effects of these basic associations with the 
conceptual self-representation on higher levels of interpersonal processing, as while these 
associations do not seem to alter self-other relations at the physical bodily level, they may 
have an effect on the self-other relationship further up the processing hierarchy. In this way, 
the incorporation of an unfamiliar face into the conceptual self-representation may have 
interesting effects in the social domain. For example, the perception of another individual as 
an out-group member, based only on facial characteristics, can have profound effects on a 
number of social cognitive processes, ranging from explicit (e.g. ratings of trustworthiness, 
intelligence, attractiveness) to implicit attitudes, as well as affecting interpersonal behaviours 
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(Pavan, Dalmaso, Galfano, & Castelli, 2011; Ratner, Dotsch, Wigboldus, van Knippenberg, 
& Amodio, 2014). Crucially, research has suggested that the neurological correlates of face 
perception also differ depending on whether the face belongs to an in-group or out-group 
member (Golby, Gabrieli, Chiao, & Eberhardt, 2001), even when group membership 
distinctions are arbitrary (Ratner & Amodio, 2013). These studies show that in-group faces 
benefit from prioritised perceptual and attentional processing relative to out-group faces.  
In our study, a perceptual processing bias towards a minimally self-associated face 
affected basic identity processing (as measured by the matching task), but it might also result 
in prioritised processing of the self-associated face’s social signals, such as emotional 
expressions and gaze cueing, in a similar way to that observed for established in-group 
members (Pavan et al., 2011). Our social lives are structured around categorising other 
individuals as either ‘in-group’ or ‘out-group’, and we show strong self-associations with 
people who we conceptualise as similar to ourselves. Our findings have demonstrated, at a 
relatively pure and fundamental level, that rapidly formed self-associations with another 
individual can alter the way in which their face is processed, and this modulation of 
perceptual processing may have fascinating knock-on consequences for social cognition. 
In conclusion, we firstly demonstrated that the conceptual self-representation can be 
extended to include a previously unfamiliar face, and that this extension of the conceptual 
self to the newly associated face results in enhanced perceptual processing of the self-
associated face. We also found that this modulation of the conceptual self-representation did 
not affect the perception of the physical bodily self, suggesting a hierarchical model of the 
self with unidirectional links between levels flowing in a bottom-up direction. In this case we 
may have identified a mechanism that can affect higher-level self-other processing; the 
extension of prioritised perceptual processing to the self-associated face may extend to the 
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processing of social signals belonging to the face, such as emotion expression, gaze cues or 
social group membership. 
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